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NARROWING I.R.S. DISCRETION: STANDARD OF
REVIEW UNDER I.R.C. § 7477
The evolution of complex multinational corporate combinations
has made transfers between domestic and foreign corporations com-
monplace. This evolution has triggered the development of an
equally complex tax structure to protect the right of the country of
the transferor corporation to tax gains realized by the transferor on
these transfers.' In particular, section 3672 of the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC or Code) governs the tax treatment of gains resulting
from transfers from domestic to foreign corporations. Section 367
provides that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) must
deny nonrecognition treatment of a gain resulting from such trans-
fers if it determines that the exchange is in pursuance of a plan hav-
ing as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income
taxes.3 Section 74774 of the IRC allows the taxpayer to petition the
1. Pugh & Samuels, Tax-Free International Corporate Combinations under New Sec-
tions 367 and 1491, 30 TAX L. 263, 263 (1977).
2. Section 367 of the Internal Revenue Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES.-
(1) GENERAL RULE.-If, in connection with any exchange described in sec-
tion 332, 351, 354, 355, 356, or 361, there is a transfer of property (other than
stock or securities of a foreign corporation which is a party to the exchange or a
party to the reorganization) by a United States person to a foreign corporation,
for purposes of determining the extent to which gain shall be recognized on such
transfer, a foreign corporation shall not be considered to be a corporation unless,
pursuant to a request filed not later than the close of the 183d day after the
beginning of such transfer (and filed in such form and manner as may be pre-
scribed by regulations by the Secretary), it is established to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that such exchange is not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes.
I.R.C. § 367(a)(1).
3. Id.
4. SEC. 7477. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS RELATING TO TRANS-
FERS OF PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES.
(a) CREATION OF REMEDY.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-In a case of actual controversy involving-
(A) a determination by the Secretary-
(i) that an exchange described in section 367(a)(1) is in pursuance of a
plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal
income taxes, or
(ii) of the terms and conditions pursuant to which an exchange
described in section 367(a)(1) will be determined not to be in pursuance of a
plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal
income taxes, or
(B) a failure by the Secretary to make a determination as to whether an
exchange described in section 367(a)(1) is in pursuance of a plan having as
one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes,
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Tax Court for a declaratory judgment regarding the reasonableness
of an adverse IRS ruling under section 367. The standard of review
applicable to section 7477 litigation is the subject of this Note.
The Note examines the circumstances leading to the most recent
section 367 amendments and to the addition of section 7477 to the
IRC. It then discusses the controversy regarding the proper standard
applicable to the review of both tax and non-tax administrative rul-
ings. The Note then analyzes Ditller Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 5
the only case arising to date under section 7477, and discusses the
standard that the Tax Court found applicable in that case. Finally,
the Note suggests potential ramifications of the Dil/er Brothers opin-
ion.
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, the Tax Court may make the appro-
priate declaration referred to in paragraph (2). Such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a decision of the Tax Court and shall be reviewable as such.
(2) SCOPE OF DECLARATION.-The declaration referred to in paragraph (1)
shall be-
(A) in the case of a determination referred to in subparagraph (A) of para-
graph (1), whether or not such determination is reasonable, and, if it is not
reasonable, a determination of the issue set forth in subparagraph (A)(ii) of
paragraph (1), and
(B) in the case of a failure described in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1),
the determination of the issues set forth in subparagraph (A) of paragraph
(1).
(b) LIMITATIONS.-
(1) PETITIONER.-A pleading may be filed under this section only by a peti-
tioner who is a transferor or transferee of stock, securities, or property trans-
ferred in an exchange described in section 367(a)(1).
(2) EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.-The Tax Court shall not
issue a declaratory judgment or decree under this section in any proceeding
unless it determines that the petitioner has exhausted administrative remedies
available to him within the Internal Revenue Service. A petitioner shall not be
deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to a failure
by the Secretary to make a determination with respect to whether or not an
exchange described in section 367(a)(1) is in pursuance of a plan having as one
of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes before the expi-
ration of 270 days after the request for such determination was made.
(3) EXCHANGE SHALL HAVE BEGUN.-No proceeding may be maintained
under this section unless the exchange described in section 367(a)(1) with respect
to which a decision of the Tax Court is sought has begun before the filing of the
pleading.
(4) TIME FOR BRINGING ACTION.-If the Secretary sends by certified or regis-
tered mail to the petitioners referred to in paragraph (1) notice of his determina-
tion with respect to whether or not an exchange described in section 367(a)(1) is
in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of
Federal income taxes or with respect to the terms and conditions pursuant to
which such an exchange will be determined not to be made in pursuance of such
a plan, no proceeding may be initiated under this section by any petitioner unless
the pleading is filed before the 91st day after the day after such notice is mailed
to such petitioner.
I.R.C. § 7477.
5. 72 T.C. 896 (1979).
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I
THE 1976 TAX REFORM ACT AMENDMENT OF
SECTION 367 AND THE ADDITION OF
SECTION 7477
A. SECTION 367: FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Internal Revenue Code sections 332,6 351, 7 354,8 355,9 35610 and
36111 provide for the nonrecognition treatment of gains realized by a
corporation upon certain exchanges of property with another corpo-
ration. If the transferee in any of these exchanges is a foreign corpo-
ration, the exchange must also meet the requirement of section 367.12
Section 367 provides that, for tax purposes, a foreign corporation
shall not be considered to be a corporation unless the domestic trans-
feror establishes that the exchange is not in pursuance of a plan hav-
ing as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income
taxes.' 3 Because corporate status is a prerequisite to nonrecognition
treatment, a corporation's failure to satisfy this section 367 require-
ment necessarily results in a recognition of gain on the transaction. 14
6. Section 332 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by a corporation
upon the receipt of property in complete liquidation of a subsidiary, provided that the
receiving corporation owns at least eighty percent of all the voting stock of that subsidi-
ary. The transfers must take place within a three-year period in order to qualify for
nonrecognition treatment. I.R.C. § 332.
7. Section 351 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized if property is trans-
ferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for the stock or securi-
ties of the transferee corporation if, immediately after the exchange, such person or
persons are in control of the corporation. I.R.C. § 351(a).
8. Section 354 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by any shareholders
if the stock or securities of a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of a plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for the stock or securities of another party to the reor-
ganization, provided that the principal amount of securities received does not exceed the
principal amount of securities surrendered. I.R.C. § 354.
9. Section 355 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized when a corporation
distributes to its shareholders the stock or securities of another corporation that the for-
mer controls immediately before the transfer. I.R.C. § 355.
10. Section 356 provides that if an exchange would qualify for nonrecognition treat-
ment under section 354 or 355 but for the fact that the corporation did not receive solely
stock, but other property as well, the exchange still merits nonrecognition treatment. The
gain must be recognized, however, to the extent of the fair market value of the other
property received. I.R.C. § 356.
11. Section 361 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by a corporation
that is a party to a reorganization when that corporation, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanges property solely for the stock or securities of another party to
the reorganization. I.R.C. § 361.
12. The relevant language of section 367 is set forth in note 2 supra.
13. I.R.C. § 367(a)(1).
14. The use of the word "corporation" in each of sections 332, 351, 354, 355, 356, and
361 makes these sections expressly applicable to corporations only. Consequently,
noncorporate entities cannot qualify for nonrecognition treatment under any of these
sections. It follows that if section 367 strips an entity of its corporate status for tax pur-
poses, any gains realized upon transfers of property must be recognized.
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Section 367 has undergone two major revisions since its enact-
ment in 1932.15 Prior to the Revenue Act of 1962,16 section 367
applied only to exchanges by parties subject to immediate U.S. tax
liability on the resulting gain.'7 For example, assume that two for-
eign corporations exchanged stock in a Type-B reorganization.' 8 If
U.S. taxpayers owned stock in those foreign corporations, the
exchange would have had future U.S. tax consequences. Yet,
because these tax consequences were not immediate, no section 367
ruling was required. 19
In section 957 of the Revenue Act of 1962,20 Congress intro-
duced the concept of the "controlled foreign corporation," 21 which
extended the application of section 367 to situations in which
exchanges between foreign corporations may only have future U.S.
tax consequences. 22 This concept, however, produced great dissatis-
faction because many U.S. taxpayers were prejudiced, not because
their foreign exchange could not pass the section 367 test, but
because they failed to realize that a section 367 ruling was
required.23 Although the Service published guidelines describing the
15. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 112(k), 47 Stat. 198.
16. Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960. Between 1932 and 1962, section 367 remained
virtually unchanged.
17. Pugh & Samuels, supra note 1, at 267.
18. A Type-B reorganization occurs when one corporation acquires the stock of
another corporation solely in exchange for the former's voting stock if, immediately after
the transfer, the acquiring corporation has control of the acquired corporation. Pugh &
Samuels, supra note 1, at 267. For an extensive discussion of reorganizations, see B.
BITTKER & J. EUSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS, 14-1 to 14-192 (1979).
19. Pugh & Samuels, supra note 1, at 268.
20. Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 957, 76 Stat. 1056.
21. A controlled foreign corporation is a foreign corporation of which more than half
the total combined voting power of all classes of voting stock is owned directly, indi-
rectly, or constructively by five or fewer U.S. shareholders. I.R.C. § 957(a). "U.S. share-
holders" are defined as U.S. persons who own 10 percent or more of the corporation's
total combined voting power. I.R.C. § 951(b).
22. For example, unless a prior section 367 ruling was obtained, what might previ-
ously have been a nonrecognition transaction involving only foreign corporations could
be, after the Revenue Act of 1962, currently taxable subpart F income under section
1248, which provides for the imposition of U.S. income tax on accumulated profits
earned abroad. Pugh & Samuels, supra note 1, at 268.
23. Id. This problem was well-stated by the Senate Committee on Finance in its
report accompanying the proposed Tax Reform Act of 1976:
[A] number of cases have arisen where a foreign corporation was involved in an
exchange within the scope of the section 367 guidelines without the knowledge of
its U.S. shareholders, and thus no request for prior approval was made. In a case
of this type, an otherwise tax-free transaction becomes a taxable transaction, and
if a second or lower tier foreign subsidiary is involved the U.S. shareholders of
the controlled foreign corporation may be taxed under the subpart F rules. This
can occur under the Service's section 367 guidelines despite the fact that a
favorable ruling would clearly have been issued by the Internal Revenue Service
had it been requested prior to the transaction.
S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 262-63 (1976).
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transactions in which a favorable ruling under section 367 would
normally be issued, 24 complaints persisted.
Two particular aspects of the pre-1976 section 367 faced pro-
longed attack. First, section 367 required the taxpaying corporation
to obtain clearance from the IRS for the proposed transactionprior
to its consummation.25 This advance ruling requirement often
resulted in undue delays for taxpayers attempting to consummate
perfectly proper business transactions.26 Second, the taxpayer was
provided with no opportunity for judicial review of an unfavorable
IRS determination under section 367. Even when the taxpayer
believed that the IRS exercised its discretion arbitrarily, the taxpayer
had no effective means of challenging the Service's determination
that one of the principal purposes of the transaction was tax avoid-
ance.27 The Tax Reform Act of 197628 amended section 367 by
replacing the advance ruling requirement with the requirement that
the taxpayer request clearance from the IRS within 183 days after
the beginning of the exchange. 29 Although this amendment elim-
inates unnecessary delays in the consummation of proper business
transactions, it creates a risk that the IRS will hold an exchange tax-
able long after the exchange has begun. Congress confronted the
other deficiency of section 367, the unfairness of the total discretion
vested in the IRS, by adding section 7477 to the Code.30
B. SECTION 7477: DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ON SECTION 367
RULINGS
Section 7477 provides the taxpaying corporation the right to a
declaratory judgment by the Tax Court with respect to an unfavora-
ble section 367 ruling.31 If the court finds the decision unreasonable,
24. Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821.
25.. I.R.C..§ 367(a)(prior to 1976 amendment).
26. Congress expressed its concern for the problem of undue delays in H.R. REP. No.
94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 262
(1976).
27. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 241 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 261 (1976).
28. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
29. I.R.C. § 367(a)(1).
30. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1042(d), 90 Stat. 1637 (codified at
I.R.C. § 7477). For a general discussion of section 7477, see Pugh & Samuels, supra note
1, at 270-71; Santi, Declaratory Judgment Procedure under IRC Section 7477, TAXES 635
(Oct., 1978).
31. Under section 7477, the taxpayer may request a declaratory judgment with
respect to the IRS's determination that the exchange had, as one of its principal purposes,
the avoidance of Federal income tax. I.R.C. § 7477(a)(1)(A)(i). The taxpayer may also
request a declaratory judgment with respect to the Service's prescription "of the terms
and conditions pursuant to which an exchange described in section 367(a)(1) will be
determined not to be in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of Federal income taxes." I.R.C. § 7477(a)(l)(A)(ii).
1981]
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it must prescribe the terms and conditions of the exchange that
would be reasonable in order to prevent tax avoidance. 32 Section
7477 also allows the taxpayer to petition the Tax Court to make its
own section 367 determination of whether the exchange is in pursu-
ance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance
of income taxes if the IRS has refused to make such a determina-
tion.33
The petitioner must fulfill certain prerequisites before he is enti-
tled to a declaratory judgment. The petitioner must first exhaust all
available administrative remedies.34 If the IRS has made an adverse
section 367 ruling, the taxpayer's administrative remedies are set
forth in Revenue Procedure 77-5.35 The taxpayer may file a protest
with the Office of the Assistant Commissioner. 36 An ad hoc advisory
board will then make a decision with respect to the protest.37 In
addition, the taxpayer may request a conference with the ad hoc
board to explain his position. 38 A failure to make such a request,
however, does not constitute a failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies.39 If the IRS has failed to make a section 367 ruling, the
taxpayer must wait 270 days from the date on which he requested
the ruling before he is deemed to have exhausted his administrative
remedies.40
In addition to exhausting all available administrative remedies,
the taxpayer must begin the exchange in controversy before he
becomes eligible for judicial review. 4t Finally, he must file the peti-
tion for review with the Tax Court within ninety days of the unfa-
vorable ruling.4 2
32. I.R.C. § 7477(a)(2)(A). The Tax Court must likewise prescribe reasonable terms
and conditions if the taxpayer requested the declaratory judgment under section
7477(a)(1)(A)(ii) with respect to the terms and conditions prescribed by the Service. See
note 31 supra.
33. I.R.C. § 7477(a)(1)(B).
34. I.R.C. § 7477(b)(2).
35. Rev. Proc. 77-5, § 4, 1977-1 C.B. 536, 538-39.
36. The application for protest must include: (1) a copy of the IRS's ruling letter; (2)
the taxpayer's reasons for his protest (restricted to factual material submitted to and con-
sidered by the Service when making its original determination); (3) the taxpayer's request
for a conference, if one is desired (see text accompanying note 38 infra); and (4) the
names of the parties that will attend the conference on behalf of the taxpayer. Id. § 4.01.
37. Id. § 4.02.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 4.03.
40. I.R.C. § 7477(b)(2). For a discussion of the special problems introduced by the
270-day requirement, see Santi, supra note 30, at 639.
41. I.R.C. § 7477(b)(3). See notes 113-115 infra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the risks inherent in this requirement. It has been suggested that this requirement
is a means to insure that a real controversy is present. If the exchange has not begun, the
Tax Court would be acting in an advisory capacity. See Pugh & Samuels, supra note I,
at 27 1.
42. I.R.C. § 7477(b)(4).
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The scope of the Tax Court's review under section 7477 is lim-
ited to a determination of whether the Service's finding of a tax
avoidance purpose was, based on the administrative record, 43 rea-
sonable.44 This differs from the scope of review allowed the Tax
Court under section 7428,45 another declaratory judgment section of
the Code. Section 7428 allows the taxpayer to petition the Tax Court
for review of an IRS determination under IRC sections 501(c)(3), 46
170(c)(2), 47 509,48 and 49420)(3), 49 with respect to the classification
of an organization as tax exempt. Unlike section 7477, section 7428
provides for a de novo review of the IRS ruling in controversy. 50
43. The Tax Court promulgated Rules 210-218 to set forth procedures to follow
when issuing declaratory judgments. Rule 217(a) provides that a declaratory judgment
will ordinarily be made on the basis of the administrative record. T.C.R. 217(a).
44. I.R.C. § 7477(a)(2)(A).
45. I.R.C. § 7428. Section 7428, like section 7477, was added to the Code by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976. Section 7428 provides in pertinent part:
(a) CREATION OF REMEDY.-In a case of actual controversy involving-
(1) a determination by the Secretary-
(A) with respect to the initial qualification or continuing qualification of an
organization as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) which is
exempt from tax under section 501(a) or as an organization described in
section 170(c)(2),
(B) with respect to the initial classification or continuing classification of an
organization as a private foundation (as defined in section 509(a)), or
(C) with respect to the initial classification or continuing classification of an
organization as a private operating foundation (as defined in section
49420)(3)), or
(2) a failure by the Secretary to make a determination with respect to an
issue referred to in paragraph (1),
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, the United States Tax Court, the
United States Court of Claims, or the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia may make a declaration with respect to such initial qualifi-
cation or continuing qualification or with respect to such initial classification or
continuing classification. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of
a decision of the Tax Court or a final judgment or decree of the district court or
the Court of Claims, as the case may be, and shall be reviewable as such. For
purposes of this section, a determination with respect to a continuing qualifica-
tion or continuing classification includes any revocation of or other change in a
qualification or classification.
I.R.C. § 7428(a).
46. Section 501(a) provides that an organization described in section 501(c) shall be
exempt from Federal income taxation. Section 501(c)(3) prescribes the conditions that
an organization must fulfill in order to qualify for such tax exempt status as a charitable,
religious, or educational organization. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
47. Section 170(c)(2) defines the type of organization to which a donation will qualify
as a charitable contribution. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2).
48. Section 509 sets forth the requirements that an organization must fulfill in order
to qualify as a tax exempt private foundation. I.R.C. § 509.
49. Section 49420)(3) sets forth the requirements that an organization must fulfill in
order to qualify as a tax exempt operating foundation. I.R.C. § 49420)(3).
50. The critical language of section 7428 from which it is apparent that Congress
intended a de novo review is, "the [court] may make a declaration with respect to such
initial qualification." I.R.C. § 7428(a)(2). In other words, the operation of section 7428
grants no respect to the discretion of the IRS. If the Tax Court finds that the administra-
tive ruling was erroneous after an examination of the administrative record, the Court
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The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 blurs the
difference between the scope of review allowed the Tax Court under
these two sections. When describing the scope of review allowed the
Tax Court under section 7428, the Senate Committee on Finance
stated, "[tjhe court is to base its determination upon the reasons pro-
vided by the Internal Revenue Service in its notice to the party mak-
ing the request for a determination, or based upon any new
argument which the Service may wish to introduce at the time of the
trial."51 Surprisingly, the committee used this identical de novo lan-
guage when describing the scope of review allowed the Tax Court
under section 7477.52 In addition, when discussing section 7477, the
committee added, "[t]he Tax Court judgment, however is to be based
upon a redetermination of the Internal Revenue Service's determina-
tion. '" 53 This language clearly indicates that Congress intended the
Tax Court to conduct a de novo review under section 7477 as well as
under section 7428.54 After all, there is no apparent reason for
according section 501(c)(3) rulings a different scope of review than
section 367 rulings. Perhaps the incorporation of the reasonableness
limitation on the Tax Court review of a section 367 ruling was
merely the result of sloppy draftsmanship. The resolution of this
problem is left to the Tax Court upon the adjudication of future
cases arising under section 7477.
II
STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
A. COMPARISON OF THE STANDARDS
When scrutinizing the findings of fact of administrative tribu-
nals, courts generally apply one of three standards of review.55 The
will reverse that ruling. Conversely, section 7477, in effect, creates a presumption that
the IRS ruling was not erroneous as long as the Tax Court finds that ruling to be reason-
able.
51. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 588 (1976).
52. Id. at 266. The language in the report discussing section 7477 differs from the
quoted language of the discussion of section 7428 in one respect - the word "argument"
in the latter was replaced by the word "matter" in the former. This difference, however,
is insignificant to the scope of review issue.
53. Id.
54. The Tax Court, in Dittler Brothers Inc. v. Commissioner, interpreted this state-
ment by the legislative committee to indicate a congressional intent totally opposite to the
intent that the author interprets the statement to indicate here. 72 T.C. 896 (1979). The
court, however, then contradicted itself by conducting the equivalent of a de novo
review. See notes 106-112 infra and accompanying text.
55. For a general discussion of standards of review and their application in the
review of non-tax administrative findings, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
SEVENTIES 646-87 (1976).
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toughest standard is the "clearly erroneous" test under which the
court will overrule an administrative finding if that finding is clearly
in error.56 Under the most lenient standard, the "arbitrary and
capricious" test, an administrative finding survives judicial review
unless the court finds that the administrative determination amounts
to an abuse of discretion.57 Under the intermediate standard, the
"substantial evidence" test, the administrative finding will not be
overruled as long as the court finds "such relevant evidence as a rea-
sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' 58
Section 7477 does not specify what standard of review the Tax
Court should employ to determine whether the IRS section 367 rul-
ing was reasonable. An examination of the standards applied by
courts when reviewing non-tax administrative rulings provides little
guidance. Courts have not agreed as to what standard should apply
in given types of cases. Furthermore, even when the applicable stan-
dard is undisputed, courts have defined and applied that standard
inaccurately and inconsistently. 59 The U.S. Supreme Court provided
a good illustration of this confusion in Consolo v. Federal Maritime
Commission.6O When scrutinizing a finding of the Federal Maritime
Commission, the Court decided that the substantial evidence stan-
dard should govern its review. 6' The Court, however, then described
the standard that it used as giving "proper respect to the expertise of
the administrative tribunal. . . . By giving the agency discretionary
power to fashion remedies, Congress places a premium upon agency
expertise, and, for the sake of uniformity, it is usually better to mini-
mize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their discre-
56. Id. at 646-47. The clearly erroneous test appears to have no application to sec-
tion 7477 proceedings. In Dittler Brothers, neither party requested the use of this stan-
dard and the court did not even consider the possibility of its application. 72 T.C. at 909.
Therefore, the clearly erroneous standard will not be discussed further in this Note.
57. See K. DAVIS, supra note 55, at 647. The standard was defined by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (review of decision by the
Comptroller of the Currency denying a national bank charter).
58. K. DAVIs, supra note 55, at 647. The U.S. Supreme Court defined this standard
in Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (review of a repara-
tion order of the Federal Maritime Commission using the substantial evidence test).
59. One prominent commentator claims that the U.S. Supreme Court has introduced
confusion into the standard of review issue by its own inconsistency:
[Ilts contribution to the new law of scope of review of rulemaking seems to be
less than zero. The Supreme Court has done more to confuse than to clarify the
law on the question whether the standard of substantial evidence may govern
scope of review . . . . The Court said no in 1971, it said yes in 1972 without
referring to its 1971 holding, and then it said yes in 1973 without referring to its
1972 holding.
K. DAVIS, supra note 55, at 656-57.
60. 383 U.S. 607 (1966)
61. Id. at 620.
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tion for that of the agency."' 62 That description defines equally well
the arbitrary or capricious test.63 At best, this indicates that the stan-
dard of review issue is unsettled. 64
B. TAX COURT APPLICATION OF STANDARDS
The Tax Court has often been faced with the standard of review
problem when scrutinizing IRS rulings. Schering Corp. v. Commis-
sioner65 expresses the Tax Court's view on this issue. In Schering, a
case involving an IRS reallocation of income ruling under section
482,66 the court acknowledged that the IRS should be allowed broad
discretion, and hence, the arbitrary and capricious standard should
apply.67 The court then noted that the IRS would have abused their
discretion if it "made a determination which is arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable."68 In other words, a finding of unreasonableness is
the equivalent of a finding of arbitrariness or capriciousness. 69 It
follows that when the Tax Court faces the task of determining
whether the IRS ruling was reasonable, the arbitrary or capricious
62. Id. at 620-21.
63. The Supreme Court provided another example of this confusion in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In reviewing a decision made by
the Secretary of Transportation, the Court determined that it would test the Secretary's
decision under the arbitrary or capricious standard. The Court stated that "[t]he ultimate
standard of review is a narrow one. The Court is not empowered to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency." -d. at 416. The Court then stated, however, that "the court
must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." d. One commentator pointed
out that the Court's selection and application of the standards as such are contradictory:
A court probably goes further toward substitution of judgment in deciding
"whether there has been a clear error of judgment" than it does in deciding
whether the administrative judgment is reasonable. The prevailing assumption
has long been that "the clearly erroneous test" involves broader review than "the
substantial evidence test."
K. DAVIS, supra note 55, at 659.
64. One question that is particularly one of scope of review is whether more than
a verbal difference ever existed between the two standards of review (substantial
evidence and arbitrary-capricious) .... The fundamental has remained
stationary that courts may not substitute judgment for that of the agencies as to
the content of legislative rules but are limited into inquiring into reasonableness;
that fundamental has always been the main part of both tests. Beyond that fun-
damental, the law has been blurred.
Id. at 288 (1980 Supp.).
65. 69 T.C. 579 (1978).
66. Section 482 allows the IRS to allocate income, deductions, and credits among
organizations, trades, or businesses when such allocation "is necessary in order to pre-
vent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades,
or businesses." I.R.C. § 482.
67. 69 T.C. at 604.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. The Tax Court also equated arbitrariness and capriciousness with unreasonable-
ness in Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 213, 219 (1977) (review of IRS's
disallowance of deduction under section 166(a)(1)); Chaum v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.
156, 162 (1977) (review of IRS's disallowance of petitioner's claimed partnership loss).
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standard must apply. Accordingly, because this is the task that sec-
tion 7477 sets before the Tax Court,70 Schering would indicate that
the arbitrary and capricious standard should apply in all section
7477 cases. Because section 367 only requires the IRS to determine
whether tax avoidance was "one of [the] principal purposes"7' of the
exchange, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the tax-
payer to prove that the IRS abused its discretion if the exchange had
any tax avoidance consequences. Hence, application of the arbitrary
and capricious standard to review section 367 rulings would be fatal
to the taxpayer. Yet, this was the state of the law when the Tax
Court, on August 27, 1979, in Diltler Brothers, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,72 heard its first case under section 7477.
III
THE DITTLER BROTHERS CASE
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dittler Brothers, Inc., a Georgia corporation, was engaged in
the printing business for more than seventy years solely in the
United States.73 The corporation began printing rub-off lottery tick-
ets by a secret process in 1974. In 1975, when the United Kingdom
liberalized its lottery laws, Norton & Wright Group Limited
(Group), a United Kingdom holding company, proposed to form a
joint venture with Dittler in which the latter's know-how regarding
the printing of rub-off lottery tickets could, through Group's market-
ing expertise, be exploited in the United Kingdom and other parts of
the world.74 Group requested that the joint venture corporation be
operated in the Netherlands Antilles, an arrangement through which
Group would realize substantial tax benefits. Netherlands tax law
provides that if a corporation qualifies as a holding company, divi-
dends paid to it by a subsidiary are tax exempt.75 Furthermore, a
Netherlands corporation owned by a Netherlands holding company
enjoys very low corporate income tax rates.76 Group already owned
Norton & Wright B.V. (NWBV), a holding company in the Nether-
lands.77 If NWBV owned Group's share of the joint venture, the
dividend exemption together with the low corporate income tax rates
70. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
71. I.R.C. § 367(a)(1).
72. 72 T.C. 896 (1979).
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would result in high after-tax earnings for Group. Dittler agreed to
Group's request.
Dittler and Group organized a Netherlands corporation, Stans-
field Security N.V. (SSNV), owned fifty percent by Dittler and fifty
percent by NWBV. 78 In exchange for the SSNV stock, Dittler and
NWBV each contributed one-half of the initial operating capital. In
addition, Dittler transferred its secret process for printing rub-off
tickets and NWBV transferred its marketing and customer informa-
tion. The parties then created another Netherlands corporation,
Opax Lotteries International N.V. (OLINV), a wholly owned subsid-
iary of SSNV.79 Through OLINV, SSNV would manage the manu-
facture and sale of the lottery tickets. SSNV immediately transferred
the know-how and cash to OLINV for 100 percent of the latter's
stock, thereby qualifying as a holding company under Netherlands
Antilles tax law.8 0
The parties agreed that OLINV would distribute its seventy-five
percent of net after-tax profits as dividends to SSNV.8 1 OLINV
would retain the remaining twenty-five percent of after-tax profits to
meet capital needs.82 SSNV would, in turn, pay the dividends to
Dittler and NWBV. This arrangement would subject OLINV to
very low tax rates. Furthermore, dividends paid first to SSNV, and
second to Dittler and NWBV, would be tax exempt.
Because Dittler's transfer of the secret process was a transfer to
a foreign corporation, Dittler was required to request a ruling under
section 367 that the exchange was not in pursuance of a plan having
as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income tax.
If the IRS would grant such a ruling, any gain on the transfer would
merit nonrecognition treatment under section 351.83 The IRS, how-
ever, ruled that the transfer did not satisfy section 367. Dittler
appealed this ruling, but on March 31, 1978, the Commissioner
issued an adverse final determination letter. Dittler then petitioned
the Tax Court for a declaratory judgment under section 7477.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ITS APPLICATION
On appeal, the Tax Court faced the issue of what standard of
review it should use to determine the reasonableness of the IRS's
78. Id. at 899.
79. Id. at 900
80. Id. at 901.
81. Id. at 901-02.
82. Id. at 902. The implications of this retention of earnings are discussed in notes
93-99 infra and accompanying text.
83. See note 7 supra. Revenue Ruling 64-56 provides that secret processes may be
considered "property" for section 351 purposes. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133.
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section 367 ruling. Because Dialer Brothers was the first case arising
under section 7477, the Tax Court's approach to the standard of
review issue may indicate the course it will follow in the future.
After reviewing the legislative history of section 7477,84 and other
judicial reviews of administrative findings of fact,85 the Tax Court
adopted the substantial evidence rule as the appropriate standard of
review for section 7477 actions. 86
To apply the substantial evidence standard of review, the court
turned to Revenue Procedure 68-23,87 in which the IRS formulated
guidelines for section 367 rulings. Section 2.02 of that Revenue Pro-
cedure provides that the determination of whether an exchange
involving a foreign corporation has tax avoidance as one of its prin-
cipal purposes depends upon an examination of all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case.88 Accordingly, the court stated that Dittler's
burden of proof was "to establish from all the underlying facts and
circumstances of the case that [the Service's] determination was not
responsible in that . . there existed insubstantial evidence to sup-
port [the Service's] determination. '89
The court then attempted to examine all the facts and circum-
stances that would prove or disprove the existence of a tax avoidance
purpose. The court first considered whether there were any idbntifi-
able purposes for the exchange other than tax avoidance. 90 Pointing
out that "it was Group . . .who demanded that the situs for the
transferee corporation be located in the Netherlands Antilles. . .for
economic reasons based upon certain tax advantages that Group
perceived for itself,"91 the court agreed with Dittler that the "princi-
pal purpose for making the exchange was to participate in a promis-
84. For a discussion of the court's review of the legislative history, see notes 106-112
infra and accompanying text.
85. The Tax Court discussed a number of cases in which courts have found the sub-
stantial evidence test to be the appropriate measure of review for administrative findings
of fact. 72 T.C. at 910.
86. Judge Forrester, speaking for the majority, stated:
It is not as narrow and restricted a review as under the arbitrary and capricious
test, which would grant respondent an almost unbridled power to misuse or
abuse his discretion. . . .We think the substantial evidence rule can be viewed
as falling somewhere between the arbitrary and capricious test and a simple
redetermination, and that is the proper test for us to use in the instant case.
Id.
87. Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821. The purpose of Revenue Procedure 68-23 was
to set forth guidelines for taxpayers with respect to the factors that the IRS will consider
when making an advance ruling under section 367.
88. Id. § 2.02. For a further discussion of the guidelines set forth by Revenue Proce-
dure 68-23, see notes 116-118 infra and accompanying text.
89. 72 T.C. at 915.
90. Id. at 915.
91. Id. at 916.
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ing joint venture with a very favorable partner. '92
Second, the court attempted to determine whether Dittler
received any actual tax benefits from the exchange from which the
court could infer a tax avoidance purpose.93 Although Dittler would
receive favorable tax consequences in the Netherlands Antilles, Dit-
tler would still be subject to U.S. income tax on its share of the sev-
enty-five percent of OLINV's distributed earnings. 94 Hence, no tax
avoidance would result with respect to this distribution. The Service
then argued that the transaction was, in effect, a license arrangement
whereby Group was granted a license to manufacture rub-off lottery
tickets. Dittler merely "opted for the form of the transaction hereun-
der to avoid Federal income taxes."95 The court concluded that
insubstantial evidence existed to show that Dittler would receive a
greater after-tax earnings if the transaction were construed as a
licensing arrangement.96 Therefore, no actual tax avoidance conse-
quences were achieved.
Third, the court considered whether the transaction created a
potential for tax avoidance in future years. 97 The IRS argued that
OLINV's retention of twenty-five percent of its earnings was not
motivated by a legitimate business purpose and would result in
future avoidance of U.S. income taxes. 98 The court ruled that this
retention of earnings was necessary to satisfy OLINV's need for
working capital and, therefore, no potential for future tax avoidance
existed to support a finding of a present tax avoidance purpose.99
Fourth, the court examined the functions that OLINV per-
formed. Presumably, if OLINV was a mere "'file drawer' invest-
ment corporation ensconced in a foreign country," 100 and performed
only passive functions, its creation was unnecessary and could only
have been motivated by tax avoidance purposes. The IRS argued
that because OLINV planned to conduct most of its manufacturing
during the start-up period through independent contractors, OLINV
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
95. 72 T.C. at 915.
96. Id.
97. We are in agreement with respondent that in determining whether the pre-
scribed purpose exists at the time of the transfer, the "potential" for tax avoid-
ance in further years should be an element to be considered. This is because
respondent has no other statutory means with which to attack an abusive situa-




100. Id. at 918.
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could not be considered an operating company.' 0 ' The court found
that OLINV performed many active functions, including ordering,
disbursing, bookkeeping, supervision of manufacturing, and devel-
oping new business. 0 2 Futhermore, the employment of independent
contractors was justified by a valid business purpose - the reduction
of start-up costs.10 3
Finally, the court considered Group's contribution to the joint
venture. If such contribution was minimal, the court could have
more easily found that the joint venture was motivated by a tax
avoidance purpose because the foreign corporation's participation
was unnecessary. The court found that Group had the marketing
information, contacts, and experience that were "so vital to the suc-
cess of this joint venture."'' °4 This analysis, therefore, yielded no
grounds upon which to infer a tax avoidance purpose. After examin-
ing all these facts and circumstances, the Tax Court concluded that
Dittler's transfer satisfied the section 367 requirement and that the
IRS determination was unreasonable.10 5
C. CRITIQUE OF TAX COURT'S OPINION
Despite the similarities in the legislative histories of sections
7477 and 7428 discussed above,' 0 6 the Tax Court in Dittler Brothers
emphasized their differences.' 0 7 It concluded that while Congress
intended the court to conduct a de novo review in a section 7428
case, the court was not to conduct such a broad review under section
7477.108 Surprisingly, however, the court's thorough analysis of the
facts and circumstances of the case was, in effect, a de novo review.
The court's holding was that Dittler's transfer "was clearly not in
pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of federal income taxes. It follows, therefore, that respon-
dent's determination to the contrary was not reasonable."' 0 9 Such
101. Id.
102. Id. at 905, 918.
103. Id. at 918.
104. Id. at 919.
105. Id.
106. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
107. 72 T.C. at 908-09. The court paid particular attention to the statement, contained
in the Senate Finance Committee's discussion of section 7477, that "[t]he Tax Court
judgment, however, is to be based upon a redetermination of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice's determination." S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1976). This state-
ment was not included in the discussion of section 7428. The court interpreted this
statement to be an indication of the congressional intent that the court should not con-
duct a de novo review under section 7477. As noted in notes 53-54 supra and accompa-
nying text, this statement could be interpreted to indicate a totally contrary congressional
intent.
108. 72 T.C. at 909.
109. Id. at 919.
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language indicates that the court concluded that the IRS's ruling was
unreasonable only after first making its own section 367 determina-
tion, based on all the facts and circumstances, that no tax avoidance
motive existed."l 0 The court's analysis clearly focused on the issue of
whether the transfer met the section 367 test, not whether the IRS
determination was reasonable."'I In this way, the court contradicted
its own findings based on its analysis of the legislative history.
Although its "substantial evidence" analysis is valid and persuasive,
the Tax Court could have bolstered its arguments by emphasizing
the similarities among the legislative histories of the declaratory
judgment sections, rather than dwelling on their differences." 12
IV
RAMIFICATIONS OF DITTLER BROTHERS
A. LESs RISK TO THE TAXPAYER
Section 7477 requires the taxpayer to begin the exchange before
requesting a declaratory judgment.' '3 This requirement creates the
risk that the IRS will require a taxpayer to recognize gain on an
exchange after it has begun.' "4 To reduce this risk, Congress sug-
gested in the legislative history that the taxpayer can fulfill the
requirement by transferring assets pursuant to an agreement con-
taining a stipulation that if the IRS subsequently renders an unfa-
vorable section 367 ruling, the assets are to be returned." 5 While
reducing the risk to the U.S. corporation, however, such a stipulation
increases the risk to the other party to the transaction. In light of this
risk, the foreign corporation may refuse to accept the condition.
Even if the foreign corporation does agree to the stipulation, such
agreement would probably cost the U.S. corporation something in
the bargaining process, thereby lessening its overall income from the
venture.
The application of the substantial evidence standard and the
focus on all the facts and circumstances of a case will not eliminate
this risk. Nevertheless, under the substantial evidence standard, the
U.S. taxpayer faces less risk than he would face under the arbitrary
and capricious standard. The taxpayer is now assured that the court
will not submit entirely to IRS discretion. The taxpayer is further
110. In other words, the court made the same determination that section 7428 requires
the court to make. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
11!. See notes 87-105 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
113. I.R.C. § 7477(b)(3).
114. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
115. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1976).
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assured that the court will look to more than the mere existence of
minimal tax consequences when making its ruling. One pro-tax
avoidance consequence will not alone disqualify the transaction
from nonrecognition treatment. Rather, that consequence will
merely be one factor weighed against the legitimate business pur-
poses of the transaction. In addition, the factors examined by the
court in Dittler Brothers provide the U.S. corporation contemplating
a transfer to a foreign corporation with a useful guage against which
it can compare the characteristics of its own transfer. Such compari-
son helps the corporation determine in advance its chances of suc-
ceeding upon judicial review.
Overall, after Dittler Brothers, the taxpayer faces a much better
chance of receiving a favorable decision from the reviewing court.
This lesser risk will make the U.S. corporation more willing to pur-
sue a good business opportunity abroad. In addition, the U.S. corpo-
ration will have a firmer bargaining position with the other party to
the proposed transaction because the latter will also face less risk.
This improved bargaining position should increase the corporation's
income from the venture because the corporation will have to give
up less to persuade the other party to accept the lesser risk.
B. EMPHASIS ON THE WHOLE FACT SITUATION
Another aspect of the Dittler Brothers opinion favorable to the
taxpayer is the movement away from strict "by the book" criteria for
determining whether a tax avoidance purpose is present. The court
must look at the whole fact situation, weighing all the underlying
facts and circumstances together. Taxpayers who, therefore, fail to
meet the specific requirements of Revenue Procedure 68-23 will not
necessarily be precluded from qualifying for tax-free treatment. For
example, Revenue Procedure 68-23 recommends that to pass the sec-
tion 367 test, the foreign corporation should either have a substantial
investment in fixed assets in the joint venture or be engaged in the
purchase and sale of manufactured goods abroad." 6 OLINV had no
such assets and engaged in no such activities. Nevertheless, the Tax
Court stated that "failure to meet that provision of section [3.02(1)]
will not, ipso facto, result in an unfavorable ruling."' "17 Conse-
quently, Dittler was allowed tax-free treatment of the transfer
despite its inability to meet the Revenue Procedure guidelines. The
court emphasized that Revenue Procedures are not enactments of
law but merely official interpretations to be used as guidance by the
116. Rev. Proc. 68-23, § 3.02(1), 1968-1 C.B. 821.
117. 72 T.C. at 913.
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taxpayer." i8 The court explained that only by looking at all the rea-
sons for, and circumstances surrounding, the transfer, can it reach a
fair decision as to what constituted a "principal purpose" within the
meaning of section 367. This emphasis on the whole fact situation
gives the taxpayer more flexibility when making transfers to foreign
corporations.
C. VIABILITY OF THE DITTLER BROTHERS PRECEDENT
Seven of sixteen Tax Court judges dissented from the Dialer
Brothers majority opinion, on the basis of the standard of review
applied by the majority.' 19 In writing for the dissent, Judge Dawson
stated, "[I]n view of the discretion . . . given to the Commissioner,
any attack on his standards or application of those standards must
show an abuse of discretion."' 20 Judge Dawson then applied what
he considered to be the appropriate test - the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard. He concluded that Dittler failed to satisfy its burden
of proving that the Commissioner acted unreasonably by denying a
favorable determination. 12'
The dissent points to three facets of the transaction to uphold its
conclusion. First, Dittler could have licensed its process and manu-
facturing know-how rather than forming a new corporation in the
Netherlands Antilles. Because the transaction contemplated that
only the subsidiaries of Group would actually manufacture and sell
the lottery tickets, petitioner's input amounted to nothing more than
a license to utilize its know-how. The dissent concluded, therefore,
that avoidance of tax must be one of the principal purposes of the
transaction. 122
Second, twenty-five percent of OLINV's profits were to be with-
held for capital expenditures, subjecting only seventy-five percent of
its profits to tax in the United States. Although the dissent consid-
ered this accumulation a basis for a finding of tax avoidance in and
of itself, it also tied that accumulation to a third tax avoidance possi-
bility. The Commissioner has no assurance that the parties will not
agree in the future to reduce the dividend distribution to less than
seventy-five percent. Tax avoidance in the future is, therefore, a real
possibility. Applying the arbitrary and unreasonable standard to
118. Id. at 914.
119. Id. at 923, 929. It is also interesting to note that in a separate dissenting opinion,
Judge Tannenwald claimed that he was not convinced that there was any difference
between the standard of review articulated in the majority opinion and that in the dis-
sent. He summed up by saying, "[tihe bricks of the house may be the same; only the
mortar may be different." Id. at 931.
120. Id. at 923.
121. Id. at 929.
122. Id. at 928.
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these facts, Judge Dawson concluded that the IRS determination
against the taxpayer was reasonable.1 23
Because the majority was slight, a domestic corporation wishing
to rely on Dittler Brothers as precedent should do so with caution.
Favorable tax consequences of the transaction, to the extent that
they exist at all, must be minimal to insure a favorable ruling. If the
overall appearance of the transaction is not tax-oriented, however,
the Tax Court will probably allow nonrecognition of gain on the
transfer.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of section 7477 remedied a long-standing unfair-
ness in the Code by creating a check on the IRS's total discretion
with respect to the tax treatment of transfers from domestic to for-
eign corporations. Congress, however, did not specify what standard
the Tax Court should employ to review the Service's section 367 rul-
ings. In Diller Brothers, the first case arising under section 7477, the
Tax Court adopted the substantial evidence test as the appropriate
standard for judicial review. The use of this test greatly lessens the
risk to the U.S. corporation desiring to make a transfer to a foreign
corporation. It also improves the domestic corporation's bargaining
position with respect to the foreign corporation. Furthermore, the
focus on the whole fact situation, including non-tax as well as tax
factors, makes it easier for a transfer with minimal favorable tax
consequences to be accorded nonrecognition treatment. Such a
result is consistent with the congressional intent to remove the total
discretion previously vested in the IRS with respect to section 367
decisions.
Elizabeth W Taylor
123. Id. at 929.
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